Erik Larson (2015) Dead Wake: The Last Crossing of the Lusitania.

Before I read this book, I thought like Erik Larson there was a direct line between the sinking of the Lusitania and the United States joining the war on the side of the Allies, much the same as happened at Pearl Harbour. But the Lusitania was sunk by German U-20 7^th May 1915. But the United States maintained a policy of neutrality despite German U-Boats sinking tens of thousands of tons of shipping and killing American citizens until the interception of the Zimmermann Telegram (a proposal from Germany to Mexico to join the war against the U.S.). Only then did the United States declare war on Germany, April 1917, joining the Allies. Did the sinking of the Lusitania make much difference (apart from those obviously on the ship)?  

When air meets water a ship is sinking. The Lusitania, four funnels twenty-four foot in diameter, filled with water which turned to steam which made a shrieking and whistling noise. They sucked in first-class passengers and spat them out again covered in soot from the coal-fired boilers. Two of them survived the sinking of the Cunard Liner. The liner sank in around twenty minutes after being hit by a single torpedo fired by U-20, fourteen sea miles from the Old Head of Kinsale, Ireland. Thirty-three infants died. Most children drowned or died of hypothermia, as did three German stowaways locked in the brig and baggage handlers unable to get on deck. Of the almost 2000 passengers and crew 1959 died. 600 bodies remained missing, unaccounted for. 123 American passengers were reported dead. Britain, France and Russia was at war with Germany and Austria-Hungary (Italy switched Alliances 2015). But it was not yet a world war.   

The sinking of the Lusitania was a triumph for U-20 Kptl. Walther Schweiger and his crew. U-boats were like underwater eggs, regarded by most nations, including Germany, as having little value. Dreadnoughts and bigger and bigger ships that went gun to gun, much like Nelson’s greatest triumph at Trafalgar (1805) when he routed the French and Spanish fleets were becoming the future that had passed. The first five German submarines, prototype U-Boats, sunk, which didn’t look like a new paradigm but money wasted. Yet, in both the first and second world wars, this guerrilla warfare underwater sunk almost a quarter of British shipping and, as an island nation, won the war for Germany, with Britain suing for peace.

‘In maritime vernacular, this trail of fading disturbance, whether from ship or torpedo, was called a “dead wake”’.

Larson outlines this scenario. Admiral Henning von Holtzendorf, 1^st February 1917, got the backing of Kaiser Wilhelm II. Stalemate on the Western front. A last roll of the dice, much like the Schlieffen Plan, but underwater with 100 more efficient U-boats. The strategy allowed for the sinking of American shipping. The premise was that by the time America became mobilised, Britain would have already sued for peace.

Just as there were warnings about card sharks in the lounges of Cunard liners like the Lusitania, Room 40 inside the Admiralty buildings in London, were the Bletchley Park of espionage during the Great War, and knew in advance what cards were to be played on the seas and by whom. They delayed one of the great warships, Orion, for example, because they knew there were U-boats lurking.

They also knew in advance the rough position of U-20 in and around the Irish Sea. It had already announced its presence by sinking a small merchant ship. The Lusitania was within range, and it was carrying passengers and munitions. The Germans had already announced such ships were legitimate targets. In ordinary circumstance U-20 would have little chance of sinking a ship like the Lusitania. Even with reduced boiler capacity, the Lusitania was almost twice as fast as U-Boats and it was going away from U-20. One in three and sometimes one in two torpedoes were duds. Even the latest torpedoes fully armed and hitting their target failed to sink much smaller ships.

Capt. William Thomas Turner left the bridge the night before the sinking to reassure passengers in the first-class lounge that they were almost home. The ship wouldn’t sink. He’d left school at nine and become a cabin boy, when ships were sailing ships (wind powered).  He’d been called upon as an expert witness on the sinking of the Titanic. His verdict was it was madness to maintain such reckless speed when there was ice in the water. Slow and careful was his strategy garnered from long years at sea. When there was a need for speed her was ready. Four of the five boilers were fired up and ready. Sometimes the cards just come out all wrong. That’s a rule of the sea.

The Admiralty and Winston Churchill scapegoated Turner. They tried to set up kangaroo courts and get him sacked by Cunard. Whether the Lusitania was left without military escorts—like later Q-ships, sitting  ducks—to bring in U-boats and the Americans into the war is a moot point. Larson dips into history and brings out what was at stake and who was involved. Make your own mind up. Read on.   

Notes:

    Winston Churchill played a significant role in the planning and execution of the Gallipoli Campaign during World War I. As the First Lord of the Admiralty at the time, Churchill conceived the idea of using naval forces to force a passage through the Dardanelles Strait, with the ultimate goal of capturing Constantinople (Istanbul) and establishing a sea route to Russia.

Planning and Decision-Making:

Conception of the Campaign: Churchill was a strong proponent of finding alternative strategies to break the stalemate on the Western Front. He advocated for a naval operation in the Dardanelles to open up a supply route to Russia and potentially knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war.

Naval Assault: The initial plan involved a primarily naval assault on the Ottoman positions along the Dardanelles. However, the naval attempt faced difficulties, including mines and strong Ottoman defences on higher ground, which took out ships without losses of its own.

Land Invasion: Due to the failure of the naval campaign, the decision was made to launch a ground invasion of the Gallipoli Peninsula. This decision shifted the focus from a naval operation to a large-scale amphibious assault.

Churchill downplayed his part in these naval and military disasters, which cost tens of thousands of lives with Turkish forces dug in. Yet he continued to insist that Captain Turner was to blame for the sinking of the Lusitania. And two torpedoes had sunk the ship. As First Lord of the Admiralty, who took a keen interest in the latest intelligence from Room 20, he knew it had been a single torpedo. Captain Turner emerges with his reputation intact. Churchill does not.